Abstract. Secure multicast communication allows a sender to deliver encrypted messages to a group of authorized receivers. A practical approach is that the sender uses a common key shared by the authorized receivers to encrypt the transmitted messages. The common key must be renewed to ensure forward/backward secrecy when group members leave/join the group, called the rekeying process. Thus, the rekeying problem is a critical issue for secure multicast communication. Many key management schemes have been proposed to improve the performance of the rekeying process. In 2010, Lin et al. proposed two key management schemes without the rekeying process. However, the transmission size required in their schemes increases linearly with the number of group members. In this article, we use the time-bound concept to propose two new key management schemes without the rekeying process. The point is that the required transmission size is constant. Performance analysis is given to demonstrate that our schemes have better performance as compared with the recently proposed key management schemes in terms of transmission size and computational cost. Under several security assumptions, we prove that the proposed schemes satisfy the requirements of secure multicast communication.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet and digital technologies, group communication has widely been used to many concrete applications such as distance education, multi-media streaming and pay-TV [1] . To achieve efficient group communication, multicast technique allows a sender to deliver messages to a group of authorized receivers. It can efficiently reduce the required network bandwidth. Since the Internet or wireless communications are operated on a public channel, the multicast messages must be encrypted to resist eavesdropping or unauthorized users obtaining the transmitted messages. A practical approach is to use a common key shared by all authorized users to encrypt the transmitted messages. For preventing the joining/left users from obtaining the previous/later messages, the common key must be renewed when the group membership is changed. Two requisite security requirements for secure multicast communication are defined as follows [2] .
 Forward secrecy: When a member leaves the group, he/she should not be able to access the future multicast messages.
 Backward secrecy: When a member joins the group, he/she should not be able to access the past multicast messages.
In order to achieve forward/backward secrecy, the common key must be refreshed, called the rekeying process. However, it also incurs the 1-affect-n problem [3] . That is, when a member leaves or joins the group, all group members will be affected because the common key is held by each group member and must be updated. For a dynamic group, the highly joining/leaving frequency would cause highly computational burden for updating the common key.
For solving the 1-affect-n problem, many key management schemes for secure multicast communication have been proposed [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Mittra [3] proposed the notion of secure distribution tree to solve the scalability problem. In the proposed framework, the group controller (GC) arranged all group members to several smaller hierarchical subgroups, while the management authority of each subgroup is assigned to a subgroup controller (SGC). However, Mittra's scheme has a disadvantage that before the encrypted message reaches a group member, it must be decrypted and encrypted repeatedly by the SGCs which locate on the transmission path. In such a case, it will cause the transmission delay. Since each SGC (or called intermediate node) can access the encrypted messages, it will incur a trusted problem whether the SGCs are trusted or not. In order to solve the trusted problem, Molva and Pannetrat [4] proposed a new key management scheme based on the distributed tree computation. In Molva and Pannetrat's scheme, all routers, network nodes or application proxies form a tree structure and they can be viewed as intermediate nodes of the distributed tree. All group members are arranged to several subgroups according to locations or functionalities, and each subgroup is linked to a leaf node in the tree structure. Each intermediate node is also responsible for a security function, but not a decrypting/encrypting function. Thus, the trusted problem of intermediate nodes will be resolved partially. However, Molva and Pannetrat's scheme did not solve the transmission delay and the trusted problem of intermediate nodes completely.
In 1999 and 2000, Wallner et al. [5] and Wong et al. [6] proposed a logical key hierarchy (LKH) tree approach, respectively. In their schemes, there is a centralized GC without any subgroup controllers. Thus, their schemes can avert from the transmission delay and the trusted problem of intermediate nodes.
The root of the logical key hierarchy tree is viewed as a traffic encryption key (TEK) which is used to encrypt messages for multicast communications and shared by all group members. The group members are arranged to the leaf nodes of the LKH tree. Each leaf node is given a key encryption key (KEK) which is shared only for the group member and the GC. Each internal node of the LKH tree is also given a KEK in order to be used to encrypt the broadcast messages and smooth the way of the rekeying process. Each group member has to store all KEKs of the path from the root to its seat while memorizing the key path. In addition, the GC must keep all KEKs corresponding to each node of the LKH tree. When a member wants to join or leave the group, the keys of all nodes on the path from this leaving/joining member to the root have to be renewed to satisfy forward/backward secrecy. As a result, they reduced the transmission cost of the rekeying process from O(n) to O(logn), where n is the number of the group members.
Afterwards, many LKH-like schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] were proposed to improve the performance of the rekeying process and the key storage requirement. In order to solve the inefficiency problem of the rekeying process, Li et al. [7] proposed a periodic batch rekeying method to reduce the overhead of the rekeying process. Sherman and McGrew [8] also proposed an optimization of the hierarchical binary tree. The Sherman and McGrew's contribution is to reduce the rekeying transmission cost from 2log 2 n to log 2 n. In 2003, Tseng [9] proposed a scalable key management scheme to reduce the key storage of the GC to a constant size. In addition, for the tree balancing problem, Goshi and Ladner [10] proposed a height-balanced 2-3 tree and presented that it has the best performance for the tree balancing strategies. However, to balance the 2-3 tree after member joining will involve the node-splitting problem. It requires 5h worst-case rekeying cost, where h is the height of the LKH tree. In 2005, Lu [11] proposed an NSBHO (Non-Split Balancing High-Order) tree, in which the NSBHO tree approach resolves the node-splitting problem. Nevertheless, these LKH-like schemes still require the rekeying process when group members join/leave the group.
In 2010, Lin et al. [12] proposed two key management schemes without the rekeying process. They described a star-based construction for multicast key management. However, the transmission size required in their schemes increases linearly with the number of group members. Thus, it inspires us to solve this transmission size problem. In this article, we propose two key management schemes without the rekeying process while the transmission size is constant. In the proposed schemes, we use the timebound concept to solve the rekeying problem. The first scheme is suitable for group members with continuous time intervals. In the second scheme, it is suitable for discrete time intervals (or called non-continuous time intervals). Under several security assumptions, we shall prove that the proposed schemes satisfy the requirements of secure multicast communication. Performance analysis is given to demonstrate that our schemes have the better performance as compared with the recently proposed key management schemes in terms of transmission size and computational cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose our key management schemes for secure multicast communication. Security analysis of the proposed schemes is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we demonstrate performance analysis and comparisons with the previously proposed schemes. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the concepts of bilinear pairings, the RSA cryptosystem, the Lucas function, and some security problems as well as assumptions.
Bilinear pairings and its security assumptions
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of large prime order q, and let g be a generator of G 1 To prove the security of the proposed schemes, we define several security problems and assumptions for bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves as follows. 

 DBDH assumption: No PPT algorithm can solve the DBDH problem with a nonnegligible advantage.
The detailed descriptions and security assumptions for bilinear pairings can be referred to [13] [14] [15] [16] .
Other security assumptions [Integer factorization and RSA cryptosystem]
Given two large prime numbers p and q, it is easy to compute q p n   . Given n, however, no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can find its factors p and q. The detailed characterizations for integer factorization can be referred to [17] . The security of the RSA cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of integer factoring problem. In the RSA cryptosystem, there are the public values n and d, as well as the secret values p, q and e such that q p n   and de  1 mod
Without knowing p and q, given n and d, an attacker cannot compute the secret key e. The detailed descriptions for the RSA cryptosystem can be referred to [18, 19] .
[Lucas function]
The detailed definitions and properties of the Lucas function are referred to [20] [21] [22] . Here, we briefly present them. Let
, where p and q are two large primes. The Lucas function is defined as
where x is an integer and the sequence Lucas function has the following properties:
. Thus, we can obtain the following equations
Given the values a, n and V a (x) above, to compute x is intractable.
[Hash Function]
A secure one-way hash function H [23] operates on an arbitrary length input m and outputs the fixed length y = H(m) such that  Function feasibility: Given m, it is easy to compute y = H(m).
 Pre-image resistance: Given y, it is computationally infeasible to derive m such that y = H(m).
 Second pre-image resistance: Given m, it is computationally infeasible to
 Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find m and m such that H(m) = H( m ).
Notations
The following notations are used throughout the whole paper:  ID i : the user U i 's identity.
 z: the maximum time of the system life cycle. is the time-bound information for a discrete time interval set T i  T, where T ={1,2,…z} is the set of all discrete intervals of the system life cycle.
 E(): a symmetric encryption function.
 D(): the corresponding symmetric decryption function of E().

Scalable key management schemes
In this section, we present two scalable key management schemes (Scheme 1 and Scheme 2) for secure multicast communication without the rekeying process. Scheme 1 is suitable for users with continuous time intervals and Scheme 2 is suitable for users with discrete time intervals. In Scheme 1, we adopt the Lucas function and the ID-based broadcast scheme [24] to construct it. On the other hand, Scheme 2 uses the RSA-based key assignment scheme and the ID-based broadcast scheme. Note that we adopt the functionality of the ID-based broadcast encryption technique in [24] into the proposed schemes, but no traitor tracing functionality is used.
Scheme 1
Assume that there is a group controller (GC) and n members U i with ID i , where 1  i  n. Here, the GC is also the key generation center to generate all needed keys and public parameters. Now, the GC would like to broadcast a message to members at time t, where z t   0 and z denotes the maximum time of the system life cycle. If t is located within members' time-bound intervals, these members can decrypt the broadcasting encrypted message. The proposed scheme consists of four phases: the system setup, the key assignment, the encryption and the decryption phases. We describe four phases in details as follows:
[System setup]
The GC first selects two large prime numbers p 1 , q 1 , and computes
. The GC defines an admissible bilinear map ê :
, where G 1 and G 2 are multiplicative cyclic groups of the same order q. Then the GC randomly selects five integers a, is a secret value of G 1 and z denotes the maximum time of the system life cycle. Finally the GC sends (I c , a i , K i ) to U i as her/his private key via a secure channel.
[Encryption]
Let M be a message to be broadcasted by the GC at time t, where z t   0 . Then, the GC performs the following steps:
Step 1: The GC randomly selects a secret value g 2  G 1 , s  G 2 and r Z q * to compute
Step 2: The GC computes ) ( Step 3: Finally, the GC broadcasts (t,
C) to all users.
[Decryption]
Suppose that a user U i owns the private key (I c , a i , K i ) for the continuous time from t 1 to t 2 . If t 1  t  t 2 , the user U i can perform the following steps to recover the message M.
Step 1: Upon receiving (t, 
Step 2: Then the user U i can obtain the decryption key k c =H(s||w t ).
Step 3: The user U i then uses the key k c to decrypt the message M= D(k c , C).
Here, we present the correctness of s and t w in
Step 1 of the decryption phase as follows:
Scheme 2
In Scheme 2, assume that a user U i wants to join the group and she/he is allowed to obtain the timebound information with a discrete time interval set T i  T. Now, the GC would like to broadcast a message to group members at time t. If t T i , the member U i can decrypt the broadcasting encrypted message while the other members U j cannot obtain the message if t T j . The proposed scheme also consists of four phases: the system setup, the key assignment, the encryption and the decryption phases. The detailed descriptions of four phases are presented as follows.
[System setup]
The GC first selects two prime numbers p 2 and q 2 to compute
The GC defines an admissible bilinear map ê: 
[Key assignment]
Assume that a user U i wants to join the group and obtain a time-bound information I d of a discrete time interval set T i . The user U i submits her/his identity ID i to the GC. Upon receiving the request, the GC randomly selects an integer a i  Z q * and computes 
[Encryption]
Assume that the GC wants to broadcast a message M at time t, where T t  and T ={1,2,…z} is the set of all discrete intervals of the system life cycle. Then, the GC performs the following steps:
Step 1: The GC randomly selects a secret value g 2 Step 2: Then the user U i can obtain the decryption key k d =H(s||k t ). 
Security analysis
In this section, we demonstrate the security analysis of the proposed schemes. The security of Scheme 1 is based on the computation of both s and w t . Meanwhile, the security of Scheme 2 is based on the computation of both s and k t . Therefore, we must prove the security of s, w t and k t , respectively. Since k c =H 1 (s||w t ) and k d =H 1 (s||k t ), we obtain the security of the encryption keys k c and k d if s, w t and k t are hard to compute. Finally, we prove that Schemes 1 and 2 are secure key management schemes for multicast communication.
[Security of the value s] Lemma 1. In the proposed schemes, any illegal user cannot obtain the value s from the broadcast messages and public parameters. 
. The other one is that Bob is given a time-bound information ) ( ▼Proof: Assume that the GC would like to broadcast a message to members at the time t . We will prove that unauthorized users or outside adversaries cannot compute the key t k  . Here, we prove two cases. 
. By the RSA cryptosystem assumption, it is hard to compute t e  because the also a contradiction with the security property "collision resistance" of the one-way hash function. Therefore, for any illegal users in Scheme 2, it is impossible to obtain the encryption key K d  H(s||k t ). ▲
Discussions and comparisons
In this section, we compare our proposed schemes with the previously proposed schemes. Here, we briefly review and analyze several previously proposed schemes that include the LKH scheme [5] and Lin et al.'s schemes [12] . Then, performance comparisons are given to demonstrate that our proposed schemes have better performance as compared with the recently proposed key management schemes in terms of transmission size and computational cost.
Review of several key management schemes [LKH scheme]
In 1999, Wallner et al. [5] proposed the logical key hierarchy (LKH) tree management scheme. In their scheme, the multicast group includes the GC and n group members u 0 , u 1 ,…,u n-1 , where the GC is responsible to generate all keys of the LKH tree. Each user is assigned to one leaf of the LKH tree. For example, eight members form the LKH tree as depicted in Fig 1. The GC gives a key k v to every node v in the LKH tree, and sends each user (via a secure channel) the keys along the path from the member to the root. In Fig 1, the user u () E is a symmetric encryption function. Therefore, when a user u joins the group, both the computation cost and the transmission size of the rekeying process are O(h) for the GC, where h is the height of the LKH tree. At the same reason, in order to delete the user u 0 from the LKH tree in Fig 1, the following encryptions ) ( 00 In 2010, Lin et al. [12] proposed two multicast key management schemes without the rekeying process. Here, we briefly review their first scheme. Without loss of generality, assume that there are n group members U 1 ,U 2 ,…, U n and a group controller (GC). The GC assigns secret keys to group members as follows: (1) The GC chooses two secret primes p i and q i , and then computes the public product 
(3) The GC, respectively, sends the secret key ) ( mod
to each group member U i via a secure channel, where i = 1, 2,…, n.
Suppose that the GC wants to send a message M to some group members. The GC first defines a set DU of dedicated users whom the GC wants to send to. Then the GC encrypts the message M by using Obviously, the transmission size is dependent on the number of dedicated users in the set DU.
Performance analysis and Comparisons
For convenience, the following notations are used to analyze the computational cost and the transmission size.
 n: the number of members in the group.  |m|: the bit size of a message m.
As reviewed in Subsection 5.1, every user in the LKH tree is assigned log d n keys from his/her location to the root. The LKH-like schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] may apply the d-ary key trees to arrange members so that the height is h = log d n.
In the following, we analyze the performance of two cases (worst case and best case) in the LKH-like schemes. For the worst case, the GC must encrypt the same message using at most n/2 different keys. Thus, the transmission size in the LKH approach is O(n). For example, in Fig. 1 , the GC wants to send the message M to u 0 , u 2 , u 4 , and u 6 . Then, M is encrypted using k 000 , k 010 , k 100 , and k 110 , respectively. Considering the transmission size in the best case of multicast communication in Fig. 1 , the GC encrypts the message using the root key k in the LKH tree. Obviously, it requires O(1) transmission size. According to the number of encryptions, the computational costs of the GC are O(1) and O(n) for the best and worst cases, respectively. Since each member performs one decryption to obtain the message for two cases, the computational cost is O(1).
As In the following, let us discuss the transmission size of our proposed schemes. In our Schemes 1 and 2, the GC broadcasts (t, X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 , C) to all members. It is obvious that the transmission size is constant since these values X 1 , X 2 , Y 1  G 1 , Y 2  G 2 , and C=E(k c , M). Thus, the transmission size required for both Schemes 1 and 2 is O(1). Considering the required computational costs for the GC and each member, the GC and each member, respectively, perform the encryption and decryption procedures described in Section 3. In Scheme 1, the GC and each member require 3T ex +T pow +T Ge +T L +T H +T E and 2T ex +T Ge + +T inv +T H +T E time, respectively. In Scheme 2, the GC and each member, respectively, require 3T ex +2T pow + +T Ge +T H +T E and 2T ex +T Ge +T inv +T pow +T H +T E +lT m time, where l denotes the size of the discrete time interval set T i . Nevertheless, four computational costs are independent on the number of group members. The computational costs of both the GC and each member are O(1). Table 1 summarizes the comparisons between the LKH-like schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , Lin et al.'s scheme [12] and our proposed schemes (Scheme 1 and Scheme 2) in terms of the rekeying process, the computational cost and the transmission size in the worst case and best case. According to Table 1 , it is obvious that our schemes have the better performance than the previously proposed schemes in terms of transmission size and computational cost. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed two scalable key management schemes without the rekeying process. The point is that the transmission size is independent on the number of group members. Meanwhile, the required computational costs of each member and the group controller are constant. We have proved that the proposed schemes are secure key management schemes without the rekeying process. As compared with the previously proposed schemes, performance analysis has been made to demonstrate that our schemes have the better performance and are suitable for a dynamic multicast group.
